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A 1929 Texas case, Davis v. State, distilled the exception to the general
rule into a single statement. "The right of arrest carries with it a con-
temporaneous search of the person, and, under some circumstances, of the
place where the arrest occurs." Forty years later, the United States Su-
preme Court revised this general rule: A lawful arrest carries with it the
right to search the person of the arrestee and also the area under his im-
mediate control. Strangely enough, the subsequent holding in Thornton v.
State more closely resembles the 1929 holding.
The Texas court's attempt to distinguish Thornton from Cbimel on the
basis of the arresting officer's motivation for the search in each case is un-
successful. Such a distinction does not diminish the controlling effect of
Cbimel. Though the cases may differ in terms of the thing sought, Justice
Stewart's majority opinion in Cbimel turns upon no such distinction. "The
only reasoned distinction is between a search of the person arrested and the
area within his reach on one hand, and more extensive searches on the
other."" Since it makes no difference what an officer seeks to discover as a
result of his right to search incident to a lawful arrest, to attempt to dis-
tinguish the cases on this ground is to rely upon an essentially meaningless
distinction. A decision based upon this distinction would no doubt be
reversed. Whether a valid distinction could be drawn on the other grounds
discussed remains to be seen.
R. Dennis Anderson
Standing To Intervene in Administrative Agency Proceedings
In 1968, Congress passed several amendments' to the Social Security
Act of 1935' which established certain federal standards for state wel-
fare programs funded under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children
search could then be used to lighten the onerous burden of the warrant requirement. 395 U.S.
at 765.
Furthermore, the search incident to arrest could be broader in scope than the search supported
by a warrant. Since a warrant requires the setting out of the specific place to be searched and the
specific things to be seized, a warrantless search in the case of a legal arrest was to be preferred.
M. BASSIOUNI, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 384 (1969).
45113 Crim. Rep. 421, 21 S.W.2d 509 (1929) (emphasis added).
4395 U.S. at 766.
'E.g., 42 U.S.C. 5 602(a)(19) (Supp. V, 1969), which calls for "prompt referral to the
Secretary or his representative [of appropriate individuals] for participation under a work incentive
program .... "; Id. § 602 (a) (8), provides, inter alia, that "the State agency [when determining
need] shall with respect to any month disregard all of the earned income of each dependent child
receiving aid to families with dependent children who is . . . a fulltime student or part-time
student who is not a full-time employee attending a school, college, or university"; id. §§ 602
(a) (14), (15), which require that the state "provide for the development and application of a
program for such family services . . . as may be necessary in the light of the particular home
conditions . . ." as well as develop programs "assuring that [a person] referred to the Secretary
of Labor . . . is furnished child-care services and that in all appropriate cases family planning
services are offered them ... .
142 U.S.C. 55 301-1394 (1964), as amended, 42 U.S.C. 55 302-1396 (Supp. V, 1969).
1970]
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Program.' In order to participate in the AFDC program, states were re-
quired to submit modified plans to the Secretary of Health, Education and
Welfare. The Secretary was then to determine whether the state plans
were within the new federal standards.4 Pursuant to administrative pro-
cedure,5 the Secretary initiated informal negotiations with representatives
of the states of Nevada and Connecticut. When, at the close of these dis-
cussions, the states failed to present amended plans, the Secretary gave
notice that hearings would be held to determine whether Nevada and
Connecticut might continue to receive federal aid for their welfare pro-
grams. At this time state affiliates of the National Welfare Rights Organi-
zatione sought intervention as parties in the hearings. When their re-
quests were denied, a writ of mandamus was sought to compel the Secre-
tary to grant the Organization the status of "party."' The federal dis-
trict court denied the Organization's requests for preliminary injunctions
pendente lite, and the Organization appealed. Held, reversed and re-
manded: Persons or organizations which are able to show that as a result
of an administrative agency determination, they are "injured in fact," that
they are persons within the "zone of interests to be protected" by a rele-
vant statute, and that judicial review of such agency action is neither ex-
pressly nor impliedly precluded by Congress, not only have the right to
judicial review of the determination, but also have standing to intervene
in any hearings on which such action is based. National Welfare Rights
Org'n v. Finch, 429 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
I. THE LAW OF STANDING
The article III' jurisdictional requirement of "cases" or "controversies"
342 U.S.C. §§ 601-10 (Supp. V, 1969).4 See 42 U.S.C. § 302(b) (1964): "The Secretary shall approve any plan which fulfills the
conditions specified in subsection (a)
"45 C.F.R. § 201.5(c) (1970):
Informal discussions. Hearings with respect to matters under paragraph (a) . . .of
this section are generally not called, however, until after reasonable effort has been
made by regional and central office representatives to resolve the questions involved
by conferences and discussions with State officials. Formal notification of the date and
place of hearing does not foreclose further negotiations with State officials.
°"Plaintiff National Welfare Rights Organization is described as a group with more than
70,000 members in 46 states which assists its members in seeking redress of their legal grievances
under the welfare laws, informs and educates its members of their legal rights, and generally acts
as the public voice for welfare recipients." National Welfare Rights Org'n v. Finch, 429 F.2d
725, 727 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
7 Such status, as sought by appellants, would include:
(1) The right to present evidence on all matters raised at these hearings;
(2) The right to cross-examine witnesses whether presented by the Department,
Nevada or any other party;
(3) The right to propose findings on which the Administrator shall rule in the
decision following the hearing;
* (4) The right to call witnesses, including employees of the Department, Nevada,
and any other party;
(5) The right to full discovery of pertinent documents and information in the
possession of either HEW or Nevada;
(6) The right to timely notice of all future proceedings in this matter;
(7) The. right to participate in any pre-determination conferences and;
(8) Any further rights as shall be necessary to enable NWRO to fully and ade-
quately represent the interest of welfare recipients in this hearing.
Id. at 730-31 n.18.
'U.S. CoNsr, art. III, § 2. "[T]he exercise of the judicial power is limited to 'cases' and
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and the judicial policy of self-restraint9 have combined to make the law
of standing in federal courts a most "complicated specialty."' * Concep-
tually, the requirement of standing concerns the parties to a lawsuit
rather than the issues contained therein.' The general rule was that a
plaintiff must be able to show an injury to a legally protected interest in
order to have standing." In applying the "legal interest" test, courts were
inclined to confuse standing requirements with court-made rules de-
signed to exclude cases "confessedly within [their] jurisdiction,"".. but in
which, for one reason or another, judicial propriety dictated a discretion-
ary avoidance." In Flast v. Cohen," which, for the first time, allowed tax-
payers standing to challenge exercises of the congressional taxing and
spending power, the United States Supreme Court stated that the article
III requirement of "cases" or "controversies" functioned only to guarantee
that suits are presented in an adversary context, "that the issues will be
contested with the necessary adverseness and that the litigation will be
pursued with the necessary vigor to assure that the constitutional chal-
lenge will be made in a form traditionally thought capable of judicial
resolution."' 9 Thus, the Court distinguished the requirements of standing,
which relate exclusively to the litigants, from considerations relating to
the merits, e.g., justiciability.'
'controversies.' Beyond this it does not extend, and unless it is asserted in a case or controversy
within the meaning of the Constitution, the power to exercise it is nowhere conferred." Muskrat
v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 356 (1911).
'"The Court [has] developed, for its own governance in the cases confessedly within its
jurisdiction, a series of rules under which it has avoided passing upon a large part of all the con-
stitutional questions pressed upon it for decision." Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936)
(concurring opinion).
l"See United States ex rel. Chapman v. FPC, 345 U.S. 153, 156 (1953).
"Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968).
"2See Tennessee Elec, Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118 (1937), wherein the Court stated:
The appellants invoke the doctrine that one threatened with direct and special injury
by the act of an agent of the government which, but for the statutory authority
for its performance, would be a violation of his legal rights, may challenge the validity
of the statute in a suit against the agent. The principle is without application unless
the right invaded is a legal right,--one of property, one arising out of contract, one
protected against tortious invasion, or one founded on a statute which confers a
privilege.
Id. at 137-38. See also Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 125 (1940); Alabama Power
Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464, 478-79 (1937). This approach is obviously circular, since if a party
is given standing, his interest is legally protected; if standing is not conferred, the party's interest
is not legally protected. C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL CouRTs 43 (2d ed. 1970).
"Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (concurring opinion). "The books are full
of opinions which dismiss a plaintiff for lack of 'standing' when dismissal, if-proper at all, actually
rested either upon the plaintiff's failure to prove on the merits the existence of the legally pro-
tected interest which he claimed, or on his failure to prove that the challenged agency action was
reviewable at his instance." Association of Data Processing Serv. Org'ns v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150
(1970) (concurring opinion). See also the court of appeals- opinion in Data wherein it was said:
"Much of the confusion on standing seems to arise from the emphasis upon the issues to be ad-
judicated or upon the possible merits of the substantive claim rather than upon an examination
of the status of the complaining plaintiff.' Association of Data Processing Serv. Org'ns v. Camp,
406 F.2d 837, 839 (8th Cir. 1969).
I E.g., cases involving "political questions." See Baker v; Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208-26. (1962).
Such questions are deemed "non-justiciable." Justiciability involves a consideration of -whether
"the duty asserted can be judicially identified and its breach judicially determined, and whether
protection for the right asserted can be judicially molded." Id. at 198.
'5392 U.S. 83 (1968).
'6Id. at 106.
't See note 14 supra.
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II. STANDING To SEEK JUDICIAL REVIEw
The Legal-Interest Test and Administrative Agencies. The legal-interest
test played a much more limited role in determining standing to seek ju-
dicial review of an administrative agency proceeding as opposed to de-
termining standing to sue generally. In 1940, the Supreme Court explained:
"It is by now clear that neither damage nor loss of income in consequence
of the action of Government, which is not an invasion of recognized legal
rights, is in itself a source of legal rights in the absence of constitutional
legislation recognizing it as such."" With respect to most regulatory agen-
cies, Congress had provided such legislation, which conferred standing to
seek judicial review on persons "adversely affected" or "aggrieved" by a
particular agency action.' These provisions were considered by courts to
be legislative exceptions to the court-created, legal-interest test." Thus,
persons who were able to bring themselves within the statutory ambit were
afforded judicial review even though they sought protection of "non-
legal" interests."
Attempts to extend the protection of non-legal interests into areas not
expressly covered by an "aggrieved-person statute" met with little suc-
cess."2 In 1946, the Administrative Procedure Act" was passed, and it
provides that: "A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action,
or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning
of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof."'" Some courts
"Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 125 (1940) (emphasis added).
"aSee, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, § 9(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77(i) (a) (1964) ("any person ag-
grieved by an order of the Commission"); Communications Act of 1934, S 402(b) (2), 47 U.S.C.
§ 402(b) (2) (1964) (a person "adversely affected" or "aggrieved" by commission action);
Federal Aviation Act § 1006(a), 49 U.S.C. § 1486(a) (1964) ("any person disclosing a sub-
stantial interest" in an order).
"°See note 36 infra; Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. McKay, 225 F.2d 924, 933 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 884 (1955); Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 699-703
(2d Cir.), vacated as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943).
2 The courts still required a "potential direct, substantial injury or adverse effect from the
administrative action under consideration." Office of Communication of the United Church of
Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1966). However, many "non-legal," and some-
times indirect and remote, interests were protected: E.g., passenger has standing to challenge ICC
rules allowing racial segregation in railroad dining cars, Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S.
816 (1950); likely economic injury suffered as a result of the awarding of a broadcast license,
FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940); representatives of an appreciable por-
tion of a television viewing audience have standing to challenge FCC license renewal on the grounds
that the proposed licensee practiced religious and racial bias in its programming, Office of Com-
munication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cit. 1966); citizen's
group has standing to challenge FPC river project as affecting their recreational and aesthetic in-
terests, Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
384 U.S. 941 (1966); coal consumers' interest in low coal prices sufficient to give standing to
challenge a minimum price order, Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir.), vacated as
moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943); potential electrical interference caused by proposed licensee sufficient
to give complainant standing, NBC v. FCC (KOA), 132 F.2d 545 (D.C. Cir. 1942), aff'd, 319
U.S. 239 (1943).
It should be noted that the above persons were deemed representatives of the public interest
and were not allowed to press private claims. The "aggrieved-person statutes" were passed in an
effort to allow public participation to assist agencies in formulating regulations in the public in-
terest. Scripps-Howard Radio v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 14 (1942).
"See, e.g., Troutman v. Shriver, 417 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied sub norm. Trout-
man v. Rumsfeld, 370 U.S. 923 (1970); Armco Steel Corp. v. Stans, 303 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y.
1969); Safir v. Gulick, 297 F. Supp. 630 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).




held that Congress intended thereby to extend the liberalized standing
requirements to persons aggrieved by a determination of any administrative
agency-whether covered by an aggrieved-person statute or not.' Others
treated the APA as a mere codification of pre-existing law and reiterated
the position that, absent an aggrieved-person statute, one must show an
infringement of a legally protected interest before the jurisdiction of the
federal courts may be invoked.'
The Impact of Data Processing and Barlow. In the companion cases of As-
sociation of Data Processing Service Org'ns v. Camp"7 and Barlow v. Col-
lins"s the Supreme Court completely rejected the legal-interest test as an
element of standing."' The Court construed the APA not "grudgingly,
but as serving a broadly remedial purpose,"' and held that the injury
required for standing was "injury in fact, economic or otherwise."" How-
ever, the Court was unwilling to leave injury in fact as the only require-
ment of standing, and it added two tests which, according to the con-
curring and dissenting opinion of Justices Brennan and White,2 were en-
tirely policy-based-not constitutionally required. Thus, a plaintiff must
show that "the interest sought to be protected . . . is arguably within the
zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitu-
tional guarantee in question."'" For this requirement, the Court appeared
to follow the language of the APA, as "zone of interests to be protected
or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee" corresponds to
the APA grant of standing to a person "aggrieved by agency action with-
in the meaning of a relevant statute. '"" The Court also looked to the APA
"' Hardin v. Kentucky Util. Co., 390 U.S. 1 (1968); Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136
(1967); Scanwell Labs. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk
Redev. Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968); American President Lines v. Federal Maritime
Bd., 112 F. Supp. 346 (D.D.C. 1953).
"
5 Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 408 F.2d 1147 (1st Cir. 1969), judgment vacated, 397 U.S.
315 (1970); Association of Data Processing Serv. Org'ns v. Camp, 406 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1969),
rev'd, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); Barlow v. Collins, 398 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1968), rev'd, 397 U.S.
159 (1970); Harrison-Halsted Community Group v. Housing & Home Fin. Agency, 310 F.2d
99 (7th Cir. 1962); Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. McKay, 225 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 884 (1955); Atcheson, T. & S.F. Ry. v. United States, 130 F. Supp. 76 (E.D.
Mo.), aff'd, 350 U.S. 892 (1955).
'7397 U.S. 150 (1970). In Data Processing a rule promulgated by the Comptroller of the
Currency allowed national banks to make data processing services available to other banks and
bank customers. It was challenged by an incorporated association of data services organizations,
which alleged that the Bank Service Corporation Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1861-65 (1964), conferred
standing to challenge the rule, since, it was argued, a legislative purpose to protect competitive
interests can be found therein. Section 1864 of that Act provides: "No bank service corporation
may engage in any activity other than the performance of bank services for banks."
28397 U.S. 159 (1970). In Barlow tenant farmers who were eligible for payments under the
Upland Cotton Program, part of the Food and Agriculture Act of 1965, 7 U.S.C. S 1444(d)
(Supp. IV, 1968), challenged a regulation promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture which
allowed assignment of those payments to secure leases of farmland. It was alleged that unscrupu-
lous landowners would require such assignments as a condition to allowing leases to the tenant
farmers.
"' "The 'legal interest' test goes to the merits. The question of standing is different." Asso-
ciation of Data Processing Serv. Org'ns v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 90 S. Ct. 827, 829 (1970).
3090 S. Ct. at 831.
31 Id. at 829.
321d. at 839.
33Id. at 830 (emphasis added).
34See note 23 supra, and accompanying text.
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for its third standing requirement: whether Congress has expressly or
impliedly precluded judicial review of the agency determination in ques-
tion." Thus, the Court treated the APA as a legislative exception to the
court-made rules of self-restraint, and adopted the APA provisions as the
Court would any other congressional regulation of its jurisdiction."
III. NATIONAL WELFARE RIGHTS ORG'N V. FINCH
The National Welfare' court had no difficulty determining that the
N'WRO had standing to seek judicial review of a decision of the Secre-
tary of Health, Education and Welfare involving state conformity with
federal welfare standards. It merely applied the three-pronged test en-
unciated in Data Processing and Barlow. The "injury in fact" was obvious-
ly economic.' The purposes of the Social Security Act of 1935 clearly in-
cluded the protection of welfare recipients-thus, bringing the NWRO
"within the zone of interests" to be protected by a "relevant statute."
Finally, the court was unable to find an express or implied congressional
intent to preclude judicial review of the Secretary's determination."
Having found that the NWRO had standing to seek judicial review, the
court went further' and held that the NWRO also had standing to inter-
vene as a party in any conformity hearings held by the Secretary."' The
court pointed out that agency determinations are presumed to be correct
on review, and that agency findings of fact are binding on the courts.
Therefore, the court reasoned that the right to seek judicial review of an
agency action would be without substance unless one were allowed to
'The pertinent provision of the Administrative Procedure Act provides for judicial review
"except to the extent that-(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is com-
mitted to agency discretion by law." $ U.S.C. § 701 (a) (Supp. V, 1969).
'"Apart from Article III jurisdictional questions, problems of standing, as resolved by this
Court, have involved a 'rule of self-restraint for its own governance.' . . . Congress can, of
course, resolve the question one way or another, save as the requirements of Article III dictate
otherwise." Association of Data Processing Serv. Org'ns v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 90 S. Ct. 827, 830
(1970).
"
7 National Welfare Rights Org'n v. Finch, 429 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
3" The court gave the following summary of the position of the NWRO:
If the Secretary finds there is conformity, and hence the flow of federal funds
is uninterrupted, appellants may claim that by his action they are prevented from
participating in a fully complying program which would be in effect had the Secre-
tary found nonconformity and thus stimulated the states to adjust their laws. Or if
the Secretary fails to call the states to account for maladministration of a conform-
ing plan, the welfare recipients may have reason to complain. . . . More importantly,
if the Secretary finds nonconformity and terminates federal grants, appellants may
allege that they are being cut off'from welfare payments without being afforded a
hearing.
Id. at 734-3 $i.34.
"'The court rejected the argument that a congressional intent to deny review to welfare re-
cipients could be implied from the fact that the legislative history of the Social Security Act
indicated an intent to strengthen federalism by allowing states the right of appeal. "Clearly it is
not contrary to that purpose that welfiie'recipients also have standing to seek review." Id. at 736.
4 See L. JAFFEE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 524 (1965): "[T]here
is no logically necessary- relationship' between the right'to an administrative hearing and a right
to appeal." However, "[c]ourts and lawyers state or assume without much reflection that'standing
to appeal does involve a right to administrative hearing .... " Id. at 525.
41 However, the court expressly held that the NWRO has no right to participate in the Sec-
retary's informal negotiations. Further, the court said that the Secretary's right to terminate a
hearing upon a determination by him that the state is in conformity is not limited by its holding.
429 F.2d at 739.
NOTES
present evidence and shape the issues on which the action is based.' The
court further supported its holding as a first step toward halting the
"escalating involvement of federal courts in this highly complicated area
of welfare benefits."'" Full initial participation in administrative pro-
ceedings, the court added, would diminish the number of wasteful re-
mands for improper exclusion of parties-a common phenomenon of ad-
ministrative law.
The court did not overlook the possible consequences of its holding on
administrative efficiency, but stated: "Efficient and expeditious hearings
should be achieved, not by excluding parties who have a right to partici-
pate, but by controlling the proceeding so that all participants are re-
quired to adhere to the issues and to refrain from introducing cumulative
and irrelevant evidence."" Thus, the threshold question of standing can-
not be used by administrative officials to exclude from hearings persons
who are likely to suffer injury in fact as a result of a proposed agency ac-
tion, if such persons meet the other requirements of Data Processing and
Barlow.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although the court rejects such a prediction, it seems apparent that
its holding will greatly enlarge the number and scope of administrative
hearings4 5-perhaps overly taxing the capacity of administrative officials
to effectively manage and control their own proceedings. Still the concept
of "private attorneys-general, '" or American ombudsmen, 7 litigating in
the public interest,"8 is a comforting one in the face of ever-increasing
governmental regulation and control. The problem is one of balance.
While the court apparently conferred on welfare recipients a substantive
right of intervention, it indicated that agency officials possess some discre-
tion to limit that right in order to conduct proceedings that will effec-
tively serve the public interest." Thus, the right to seek judicial review
4 The court cites American Communications Ass'n v. United States, 298 F.2d 648, 650-51
(2d Cir. 1962), wherein it was said: "[H]ere intervention is necessary in order to make the right
of review effective. [Petitioning for the taking of new evidence] is not an effective substitute
for the right to adduce evidence, to cross examine witnesses, and to present arguments at the
initial hearing."
' Rosado v.. Wyman, 90 S. Ct. 1207, 1223 (1970).
44429 F.2d at 738, quoting Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n v. FPC, 265 F.2d 364, 368
n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
4 "[I]f the relaxation of standing requirements does not necessarily expand the number and
scope of administrative hearings, recent experience demonstrates that almost inevitably it does
have that effect." L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 525 (1965).
'See Judge Frank's comment in Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704. (2d Cir.),
vacated as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943).
- 4.For a discussion-of the. ombudsman
. 
as an outgrowth of the "welfare state," see McClellan,
The Role of the Ombudsman, 23 U. MIAMI L. REV. 463 (1969).
.. 48 Of course, it is entirely possible that the public interest will be lost in the shuffle. See Fried-
man, Special Interest and the Law, 51 CHI. B. RECORD 434 (1970).
% ."'.Thus, the court said: "Except for the adjustments necessary for assuring the manageability
of administrative proceedings, the criteria for standing for review of agency action appear to
assimilate the criteria for standing to intervene." 429 F.2d at 732-33 (emphasis added). Accord-
ingly, "as Scenic Hudson [Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 617 (2d Cir. 1965)]
established for the FPC, agencies have some discretion in limiting intervention. '[R]epresentatives
of common interests by an organization such as [intervenors] serves to limit the number of those
1970)
